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Daniel S. Sam, #5865 
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435-789-1301 // FAX 435-789-1344 
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PARTIES TO THIS ACTION 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1), the parties to this action are listed as follows: 
Brian Hunter, Plaintiff/Appellant 
Sunrise Tide Company, Defendant/Appellee 
Sharlene Bensen, Defendant (not a party to this appeal) 
RS West Real Estate, Defendant (not a party to this appeal) 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
Re: Hunter v. Sunrise, Supreme Court No. 20010960-SC 
Citation of Supplemental Authorities under Utah R. App. P. 24(i). 
Dear Clerk of the Court: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I am submitting this 
letter, along with nine copies hereof, to supplement the authorities of the Brief of Appellant. 
Supplemental authority: Eastmond v. Earl, 912 P.2d 994 (Utah App. 1996) 
This authority should be inserted under the Statement of Issues, page I of the Brief of 
Appellant, and under the Argument, page 6 of the Brief of Appellant (immediately following the 
quoted material from case of Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 1990)). 
The Eastmond case recently came to the attention of Appellant's counsel, and is pertinent 
and significant to this appeal because, as with this case, the issue there was whether a co-
defendant could be served more than 120 days following the filing of the case where another co-
defendant was served within 120 days. 
In the Eastmond ense, one defendant (the "First Defendant") was served on August 13, 
1987, within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. The First Defendant thereafter filed 
bankruptcy. On February 9, 1992, the other defendant (the "Second Defendant") was served with 
the summons and complaint. The trial court in Eastmond granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Second Defendant in part because he was not served within 120 days of the filing of the 
complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in part because, under Rule 4(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where one defendant is served within 120 days of the filing of the 
complaint, a co-defendant may be served at any time "prior to trial." 
Based on the above, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Eastmond case be 
supplimented to the Appellant's brief. 
Janiel S. Sam 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
DSS/he 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, 
Hon. A. Lynn Payne, dated October 25, 2001, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0'); 
to wit, appeal from a District Court decision dismissing action on motion to dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY, AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
I DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS UNDER AUTHORITY OF Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)? 
Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. 
Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895 (Utah 2001); Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. EldonJ. Stubbs Construction, 
Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986); Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 
1990). 
The above issue was preserved in the trial court for appeal because it forms the basis 
upon which the final order was entered. See Order (T. at 327). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) is believed to be determinative of this appeal 
or of central importance to the appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) reads as follows: 
Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the 
summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no 
later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the 
court allows a longer period time for good cause shown. If the 
summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be 
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dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon 
the court's own initiadve. In any action brought against two or 
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of 
them within die 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed 
by the court, the other or odiers may be served or appear at any 
time prior to trial. 
There are no other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is believed to be determinative of diis appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action which was originally brought by the Plaintiff to recover damages 
against Defendant Sunrise and two other defendants where Defendant Sunrise was the closing 
agent (tide company) in a real estate transaction handled in July and August 1995, and the 
other two defendants were real estate sales agents in the same transaction. Plaintiff owned an 
equitable (unrecorded) interest in the real estate involved in the transaction. The transaction 
purported to convey tide from die record tide owner to Morgan Glines, who was an officer 
and shareholder of Defendant Sunrise. Plaintiff obtained an order in the case of Hunter v. 
Glines, in the Eighth District Court of Duchesne County, Roosevelt Department, State of > 
Utah, case no. 950000136, filed May 18, 1998 (See this order enclosed herein in the 
Addendum), effectively nullifying die transaction and vesting tide in die real estate in the 
name of Plaintiff (the Judgment referenced therein, dated November 20,1997, is also enclosed 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Heather T. Eskelson, do hereby certify that 1 mailed first class, postage prepaid, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing letter on this \V C day of April, 2003, to: 
Clark B. Allred 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, 
MCCLELLAN & TROTTER 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee . > 
, , Heather T. Eskelson, Secretary 
V Iluiiter.suppaulh.wpd J 
in the Addendum). Plaintiff then filed this action in July 1998 against Defendant Sunrise and 
the other two defendants for damages alleging breach of fiduciary duty, slander of title, fraud, 
and/or negligence in the manner in which the sale transaction was conducted by the Defendant 
Sunrise and the other two defendants. 
n. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter against the Defendant Sunrise, Sharlene 
Bensen ("Bensen") and RS West Real Estate ("West") on July 14, 1998, requesting damages 
against the defendants arising from the real estate sales transaction held on July 26, 1995. (T. 
at 3-10). After having been served with Summonses, Bensen answered the Complaint on 
October 29, 1998 (T. at 20) and West answered the Complaint on October 27, 1998 (T. at 
11). On June 16, 2000, following a hearing on West's and Bensen's Motions for Summary 
Judgment (see Court minutes, T. at 238 and T. at 268), the Plaintiff, Bensen and West entered 
a Stipulation and Motion for Order of Dismissal (T. at 285), dismissing the action against 
Bensen and West, but specifically reserving the issues as to Defendant Sunrise. On June 26, 
2000, the Order, pursuant to the Stipulation and Motion, was entered (T. at 292). This order 
specifically reserved the Complaint against Defendant Sunrise and did not constitute a final 
judgment as to West and Bensen under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). On May 17, 2001, Plaintiff 
filed an Amended Complaint (T. at 308). The Amended Complaint and Summons was served 
on Defendant Sunrise on May 18, 2001 (T. at 329). On June 7, 2001, Sunrise filed a Motion 
to Dismiss (T. at 279) and a memorandum in support thereof (T. at 281) based on the fact that 
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Sunrise was not served within 120 days of the filing of the original Complaint. Plaintiff filed 
a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss on June 13, 2001 (T. at 288) and 
Sunrise filed a reply memorandum in support on June 26, 2001 (T. at 294). The Court 
initially denied the motion to dismiss by Ruling dated September 17, 2001 (T. at 320). 
However, following a Motion to Reconsider, filed by Sunrise on September 19, 2001 (T. at 
322), the court, on October 2, 2001, reversed its prior ruling, and entered a Ruling granting 
the Motion to Dismiss (T. at 325). The Order on the October 2, 2001, Ruling, constitutes a 
final judgment for purposes of appeal, was entered on October 25, 2001 (T. at 327). The 
Notice of Appeal in this matter was filed on Monday, November 26, 2001 (T. at 342). The 
Stipulation and Motion for Order of Dismissal, filed on June 13, 2000, (T. at 285), the Order 
of Dismissal, filed June 26, 2000, (T. at 292), the Ruling dated October 2, 2001, (T. at 325), 
and the Order of Dismissal dated October 25, 2001, (T. at 327) are also enclosed in die 
Addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The material facts on this appeal for the most part are procedural in nature and are 
primarily set forth in the Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below section above 
supplemented by the following relevant facts. 
2. Defendants Bensen and West both answered the original complaint within 120 
days of the filing of the original complaint (T. at 11, 20, and 328). 
3. The Court only granted a partial summary judgment in favor of West and Bensen. 
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(T. at 268) Certain counts of the Complaint were still outstanding at the time the Plaintiff, West 
and Bensen entered into the stipulation (T. at 268 and 285). 
4. The Order of Dismissal regarding the claims against West and Bensen, filed June 
26, 2000, (T. at 292), specifically reserved the complaint against Defendant Sunrise and does 
not contain an express determination and direction under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Two of the defendants in this action were served and generally appeared within 120 days 
of the filing of the original complaint. The case was still pending as to all of the Defendants on 
May 18, 2001, the date on which the Defendant Sunrise was served with the summons. 
Therefore, the Defendant Sunrise was timely served within the meaning of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). 
ARGUMENT 
I DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS UNDER AUTHORITY OF Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)? 
A. The Order Erroneously Applies Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). 
The Order (T. at 327-330) erroneously applies Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) in dismissing the 
Complaint as to Defendant Sunrise. The last sentence of this Rule states as follows: 
In any action brought against two or more defendants on which 
service has been obtained upon one of them within the 120 days or 
such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or 
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
In the case of Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court dealt with this issue. In Barber, the Plaintiffs sued the Defendants, a limited 
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partnersliip, and general partners, for renewal of a judgment in March 1987. The Plaintiffs 
served two of the general partners with summonses, but served them in their individual 
capacities and not in their representative capacities as general partners. A third general partner 
was not served. The trial court renewed the judgment against the partnership and against the 
three general partners on a partial summary judgment. In its ruling on appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Appellants challenge the renewal of the judgment because 
Don White, one of the general partners, was not served. It is true 
that the judgment against White cannot be renewed without proper 
service on him. Failure to serve White, however, has no effect on 
the renewal of the judgment against the two general partners who 
were served. We therefore vacate the renewal of the judgment 
against White and against the partnersliip. We note, however, that 
service upon these parties can still be attempted. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(b) provides, "In any action brought against two 
or more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one 
of them within [the proper time period], the other or others may be 
served or appear at any time prior to trial. Because the other 
defendants were properly served and the trial court only 
granted a partial summary judgment, the Barbers can still try 
to serve White and the partnership at any time prior to final 
disposition of the case. 
Barber, 800 P.2d at 797-798. (Citations omitted, emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, the Defendant Sunrise was one of three defendants named in the 
original complaint filed in July 1998. The other two defendants, West and Bensen, were 
properly and timely served within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. In June 2000, 
following a ruling partially granting and partially denying motion for summary judgment filed 
by Defendants West and Bensen, the Court entered a ruling based on a stipulated settlement 
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among the Plaintiff, West and Bensen, dismissing the matter against those defendants but leaving 
the matter open as to Defendant Sunrise. On May 18,2001, Defendant Sunrise Title was served 
with a summons and the amended complaint. 
B. The Court is Bound by the Plain and Unambiguous Language of Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4(b). 
According to the plain and unambiguous language of the last sentence of Rule 4(b) and 
according to the Barber case, Defendant Sunrise has been properly served. The Court's order 
dismissing plaintiffs case goes beyond the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b) by 
adding unwritten exceptions and qualifications which cannot be gleaned by any reasonable 
reading of the rule. It is clear that the appellate courts of this state follow and are bound by the 
plain and unambiguous language of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Prowswood, Inc. v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984); Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225, 
426 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah 2001) (stating, "[T]his court has consistently looked to the 
plain language of the applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining to read additional 
language into the rule."); and Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. EldonJ. Stubbs Construction, Inc., 714 
P.2d 1142,1143 (Utah 1986). In the Valley Asphalt case, referring to Rule 4(b), the court stated, 
"[I]f the requirements of timely issuance and service are met as to one defendant, the rule clearly 
allows other defendants, whether named in the original complaint or brought in by amendment, 
to be served any time before trial." Id. Based upon the cases cited, Rule 54(b), and the plain 
and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b), it is clear that the Court's Order in this case goes 
beyond the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b). Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the 
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plain language of the Rules of Civil Procedure. If the Plaintiff cannot rely on the plain language 
of the rules because the courts have such broad discretion to interpret the rules as they please, 
then it would be impossible to expect the Plaintiff and the public in general to have notice of the 
requirements of the rules. Therefore, to the extent that the court dismissed this case on 
interpretations and reasoning that goes beyond the plain language of Rule 4(b), the Court has 
erred in granting the motion to dismiss. 
C. The Order is Based on Erroneous Assumptions. 
The Court in the Order (T. at 327-330) makes several erroneous assumptions which are 
the basis for the dismissal of Plaintiff s case. 
First, in the Order at paragraph 6 (T. at 229), the court states that, "Rule 4(b) only allows 
service later than the 120 days upon a co-defendant when there are issues involving the co-
defendants which are pending before the court." The Court further states in paragraph 6 of the 
Order that, "In this case all co-defendants had been dismissed on June 22,2000." This language, 
as a statement of the court's interpretation of Rule 4(b), is based on the erroneous premises that 
as of June 26, 2000, there were no triable issues before the Court and that the June 26, 2000, 
order acted as a final judgment as to Bensen and West for purposes of Rule 54(b). 
In this case, there were issues pending involving a co-defendant on the date Sunrise was , 
served. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) makes it clear that the June 26, 2000, Order had not become a 
final judgment, as defined by Rule 54(a), for purposes of appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) states 
in pertinent part as follows: 
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Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and./or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by 
the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of 
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all 
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(Emphasis added) 
Thus, based on Rule 54(b), it is clear that the case was still open and pending as to all of 
the parties on May 18, 2001, the date the Defendant Sunrise was served. Therefore, the Court's 
reasoning for dismissing the case by the October 25, 2001, Order (T. at 327) is flawed. 
Second, at paragraph 5 of the Order (T. at 328), the Court suggests that the Amended 
Complaint (T. at 308) states different causes of action than the original Complaint (T. at 3). In 
fact, the first cause of action of the Amended Complaint (fiduciary duty) is the same as the 
second cause of action of the original Complaint and the third cause of action of the Amended 
Complaint (fraud) is the same as the fourth cause of action of the original Complaint. Thus, the 
October 25, 2001, Order is further flawed to the extent that the Court's reasoning for dismissal 
of is supported by paragraph 5 of the Order. 
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D. The Plam Language of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) is Consistent with Utah R. Civ. 
P. 71B(b). 
Finally, Utah R. Civ. P. 71B(b) provides as follows: 
Proceedings after judgment against parties not originally served. 
When a judgment has been recovered against one or more, but not 
all, of several persons jointly indebted upon an obligation, the 
plaintiff may require any person not originally served with the 
summons to appear and show cause why he should not be bound by 
the judgment in the same maimer as though he had been originally 
served with process. 
Rule 71B(b), like Rule 4(b), does not provide any basis for inferring that are unwritten 
requirements, like that of requiring that issues should still be pending before the court at the time 
the unserved defendants are finally served, like the Court in this case required. In fact, it is 
consistent with Rule 4(b), and in fact it is in direct opposition to the Order (T. at 327) of the 
Court in this case by clearly authorizing the plaintiff to serve an unserved defendant even if there 
is a final judgment obtained against co-defendants who have been served. In essence, even if 
there are no triable issues before the Court against a co-defendant, the plaintiff may still bring 
an unserved defendant before the Court to answer to the judgment. In light of Rule 71B(b), it 
is even more likely that one would rely upon the plain language of Rule 4(b) and do what'the 
Plaintiff did in this case, believing that Rule 4(b) authorized later obtaining service of process 
upon an unserved defendant. 
Based on the Order (T. at 327), it is clear that the Court's intention was to dismiss on the 
basis that there was no triable issue pending against a party that was served within the 120 day 
period. This basis for dismissal is not only unsupported by any law but goes against the plain 
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language of Rule 4(b), against Rule 54(b), against Rule 71B(b), and is contrary to the language 
of the Utah Supreme Court in the Barber case. If the Court's Order were allowed to stand, it 
will creates a situation where a reasonable person could be fooled by the plain language of Rule 
4(b). There is certainly no notice to the public that Rule 4(b) can be interpreted in a manner 
other than its plain and unambiguous language which is supported by Rule 71B(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the case law presented herein and the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 
4(b), the District Court clearly erred in granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiff 
is entided to rely upon, and the Courts are bound to follow the plain language of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Court's interpretation of Rule 4(b) is contrary to the plain language of 
that rule and is based upon erroneous assumptions. Therefore, the Order granting dismissal 
is erroneous. Therefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the District Court's Order of 
Dismissal, dated October 25, 2001, be reversed 
Respectfully submitted this /t) day of May, 2002. 
DANIEL S. SAM 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Nichole Young, do hereby certify that on May IT) , 2002, I mailed first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
Clark B Allred 
McKeachnie, Allred, McClellan & Trotter, P.C. 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Nichole Young, Le^dl Secretary* 
z Dunn.app.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
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DANIEL S. SAM, #5865 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Brian Hunter 
319 West 100 South, Suite 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone (43 5) 789-13 01 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN HUNTER and JANET HUNTER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
MARY ROWSELL, a single woman, 
and C. MORGAN GLINES and 
VELLA R. GLINES, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
On the 6th day of February, 1998, the Plaintiff Brian Hunter, 
through his attorney, Daniel S. Sam, presented to the Court his 
Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment. The Court notes that on 
November 20, 1997, it entered its Judgment in this matter and that 
under paragraph 3 of the Judgment, Plaintiff was required to 
release Glines of the Zions Bank obligation within sixty (60) days 
of the Judgment and that if he did so the real property at issue in 
this matter would vest in the name of Plaintiffs. The Court also 
notes that in an Order dated January 14, 1998, it extended 
1 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
1/8 1998 
J<6ANNEN$KEE, CLERK 
77 .DEPUTY 
A 
ORDER DECLARING SATISFAC-
TION OF JUDGMENT AND 
VESTING TITLE 
Civil No. 950 000 136 
Plaintiff's time to obtain the release to January 30, 1998, and in 
an Order dated January 28, 1998, it again extended the time to 
February 3, 1998. The Court also notes that the Plaintiff, Janet 
Hunter, died after the commencement of this matter, but prior to 
the trial. The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff's Notice and its 
attached exhibits finds that said Notice presents satisfactory 
evidence for the Court to conclude that the Plaintiff, Brian 
Hunter, did obtain a release of Defendants, Glines, from the Zions 
Bank obligation within the time required by the Court and that the 
real property in question should now vest in the name of Plaintiff, 
Brian Hunter. In light of the presumption of Section 57-1-5(1) (a) , 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, the Court also concludes that 
since this matter was filed and prosecuted by the Plaintiffs, Brian 
and Janet Hunter, as husband and wife, the property should have 
vested in Joint Tenancy if Janet Hunter would have now been living. 
NOW, THEREFORE, upon full consideration of the issue, the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, hereby Orders that: 
1. The requirement imposed upon Plaintiff, Brian Hunter, by 
the Court in paragraphs 2.d. and 3. of its Judgment dated November 
20, 1998, to obtain a release of Defendants, C. Morgan Glines and 
Vella R. Glines, from the Zions Bank obligation is hereby declared 
to be fully satisfied. 
2. The real property in question, located in Duchesne 
2 
County, State of Utah, and described as follows, does hereby ve 
as of February 3, 1998, in fee simple absolute, in the name 
Plaintiff, Brian Hunter: 
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL BASE & 
MERIDIAN 
Section 19: Beginning at a point 63 feet South and 382 
feet West of the Northeast Corner of the Northeast 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; thence North 63 feet; 
thence West 200 feet; thence South 300 feet; thence 
Northeasterly 308 feet, more or less, to the point of 
beginning. 
A non-exclusive easement to use a right-of-way as granted 
by C. Morgan Glines and Vella R. Glines, husband and 
wife, to James W. Hoopes, et. , al. , by Agreement recorded 
November 12, 1980, as Entry No. 211609 in Book A-77 page 
857, records of Duchesne County, Utah; which right-of-way 
is described as follows: 
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL BASE & 
MERIDIAN 
Section 19: Beginning 330 feet North of the East Quarter 
Corner thence Southwest to a point 382 feet West and 30 
feet North of said East Quarter Corner; thence West 938 
feet; thence South 30 feet; thence East 938 feet; thence 
Northeast to a point 30 feet South of the point of 
beginning; thence North 30 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
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SUBJECT to all existing easements and rights-of-way. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, and mineral rights. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Gaylel\F. McKeachnie 
NOTICE 
The below referenced parties will PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
the undersigned will submit the foregoing Order Declaring 
Satisfaction of Judgment and Vesting Title to the Judge of the 
Eighth Judicial District Court for signature upon the expiration of 
five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for 
mailing, unless a written objection is filed with the Court prior 
to that time. Please govern yourself accordingly. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Trisha Hamner, do hereby certify that on the lp day of 
February, 1998, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Declaring Satisfaction of Judgment and Vesting Title, was mailed, 
4 
postage fully prepaid, faxed, or hand delivered to the following: 
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Clark B. Allred, Clark McClellan, McKEACHNIE, 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C., 855 East 200 North (112-10), Roosevelt, 
Utah 84066 and Gayle F. McKeachnie/Clark B. Allred, Clark 
McClellan, McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C., 121 West Main, 
Vernal, Utah 84078. 
y 
Trisha Hamner, Secretary 
may hunter.ord 
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FILED 
NOV 2 0 1997 
JO. 
BY-
JEHcMEE. CLERK 
.DEPUTY 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants, Glines 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (801) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
BRIAN HUNTER AND JANET HUNTER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARY ROWSELL, a single woman, and, 
C. MORGAN GLINES AND VELLA R. 
GLINES, husband and wife, 
Defendants, 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950000136 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Claim of Defendants C. Morgan Glines and Vella R. 
Glines for unlawful detainer is dismissed. 
2. The warranty deed for the property in question from the 
estate of Ladd C. Richman to Mary Rowsell is hereby reformed to a 
mortgage upon the following terms: 
a. The date of the mortgage is February 15, 1995. 
b. The mortgage secures a loan made by Mary Rowsell to 
Brian and Janet Hunter. 
c. The amount of the loan secured by the mortgage is 
$15,000.00, the amount that Mary Rowsell borrowed from Zions First 
National Bank. 
d. The obligation secured by the mortgage is to be paid 
by Hunter by obtaining the release of C. Morgan and Vella Glines 
from the obligation the Glines' undertook to Zions Bank, the 
proceeds of which were used to pay off the loan Mary Rowsell made 
to pay off the Richman obligation, and to provide money to Rowsell 
for other purposes. 
3. The release of Glines by Hunter must be made within sixty 
(60) days of the signing of this judgment. If such action is taken 
within sixty (60) days, title to the property in question shall 
vest in the name of Brian and Janet Hunter. 
4. If Glines are not released from their Zions Bank 
obligation within sixty (60) days of the date of this judgment, 
Hunter will default in his obligation under the mortgage and shall 
have no further claim to the property. 
5. Hunter is awarded damages against Mary Rowsell in the 
amount of $1,260.00 for loss of income and $12,230.00 for attorneys 
fees . 
6, Except as indicated in paragraph 5 above, the parties 
shall be responsible for their own attorneysyf^s and costs, 
DATED this day of November, If 
MARK J. WILLIAMS #3494 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. "' i? • 
Attorneys for Defendant 
R S West Real Estate .,, - ^ ^ 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 [yi.---^"-" 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN HUNTER, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
SHARLENE BENSEN; R S WEST RE AL ] 
ESTATE, a Utah real estate agency; ] 
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah lilie ] 
insurance agency, ] 
Defendants. } 
) STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
) Civil No. 980000102CV 
) Judge: A. Lynn Payne 
Plaintiff Brian Hunter, by and through his attorney, Daniel S, Sam, and defendant, 
Sharlcno Bensen, by and through her attorney, Rand Ilirschi, and defendant, R S West Real 
Estate, a Utah corporation, by and througli ils attorney, Mark J, Williams, hereby stipulate and 
move the court to enter an order in this mailer dismissing plaintiffs complaint against these 
defendants only, with prejudice and upon the merits, said aclion having been fully compromised 
and settled against these defendants only, and ordering the parties to bear its own costs. The 
plaintiff does not intend to dismiss, and hereby reserves its complaint against the remaining 
defendant, Sunrise Title Company. 
DATED this 7 day of l ^ A i ^ r . , 2000. 
A .1 .^/AAA*/} 
Daniel S. Sam 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED this 9^1 j day of sf/sf/Z^ 
_, 2000. 
Attorney for Defendant Sharlene Benscn 
t* 
DATED this II "day of. . , / " n< 
_, 2000, 
/>' 
-r'/r, / /<^#U-. 
Mark J. WiUiams' 
Attorney for Defendant RS West Real Estate 
MARK J. WILLIAMS #3494 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
R S West Real Estate 
136 Bast South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
...» VA -/m 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN HUNTER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SHARLENE BENSEN; R S WEST REAL ) 
ESTATE, a Utah real estate agency; ) Civil No. 980000102CV 
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah title ) J udgc: A. Lynn Payne 
insurance agency, 
Defendants. 
Upon reading the Stipulation and Motion for Order of Dismissal, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs complaint be and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits against defendants, Sharleno Bensen and RS West 
Real Estate only, with prejudice and upon the merits, and that each party shall bear its own costs. 
DATED this V~~ day of 1) ' ^ v ,2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Daniel S. Sam 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
'At* 
Rand I'lirschV" 
orney for Defendant Bensen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ccrti fy that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed via United States 
Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the 12/day of .^A.AJU. , 2000, as follows: 
Daniel S. Sam 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Mike 1-Iomer 
Rand Hirschi 
Suitler Axland 
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 34101 
'V.""goJUA CV-7J/A 
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FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHiSNE COUNTY, UTAH 
OCT - 2 2001 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
BY r'-C.CK DEPUTY 
In The Eighth Judicial District Court Of Duchesne County 
Stare of Utah 
BRIAN HUNTER, | 
I RULING 
Plaintiff, 
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah | 
Corporation, j CASE NO.980000102 
Defendant. j 
, _ _ I 
On Sept. 13, 2001, the Court entered it's Ruling on the Defendant's (Sunrise Title 
Company) Motion to Dismiss. In it's Ruling the Court noted that (he Defendant, had not 
replied to the response of Brian Hunter, 'The Defendant lias now filed a Motion to Reconsider 
based upon the fact that the Defendant had filed a reply which the Court had not reviewed. 
It is obvious that the reply was timely filed and should have been considered by the 
Court, Therefore, the Motion to Reconsider is granted. In it's reply the Defendant points to 
the fact that all issues relating to the Co-Defendants, (Benson and R.S. West) were fully 
resolved prior to service upon Sunrise. Defendant points out that the language of Rule 4(b) 
only provides for service on Sunrise beyond 120 days if Sunrise is served prior to trial. The 
Defendant's point is well taken. All issues involving the Co-Defendants (Benson and R, S. 
West) had been fully resolved prior to service on Sunrise. 
Rule 4(b) only allows for service upon a co-defendant beyond 120 days when there arc 
issues involving co-defendants which are pending before the Court, Therefore, the Court will 
set aside it's Sept. 13, 2001 Ruling and grant Ihe Moiiori to Dismiss. 
DATED this JL day of Oct., 2001. 
A. Lynn Payne, lXstrict Court Judge 
Mailing Certificate . , 
1 do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, on the _£_ day 
of Oct., 2001, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
Daniel S. Sam 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, UT S4078 
Clark B. All red 
72 North 300 Hast (123-14) 
Roosevelt, UT SAM 
Deputy Court Clerk 
EXHIBIT A 
FILED 
KVR;CT COURT" 
DC! 2 J 2:01 
.jC'A'-i.'iti !••',;-''-'i:'l. Oi£i'!!\ 
DY. -jim.'.ip^DEFUTir 
GAYLE F McKEACHNIE - 2200 ' "" 
CLARK A. McCI.ELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLFLLAM & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, Sunrjse Title Company 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435} 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
BRIAN HUNTER, ) ORDER 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) Civil Mo. 980000102 
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, ) 
) Judge: A. Lynn Payne 
Defendant ) 
The above captioned matter came before the Court, for ruling 
on Defendant, Sunrise Title Company's Motion to Reconsider Motion 
to Dismiss on Basis that Reply Memorandum had been Filed and 
Request for Oral Argument. The Court previously ruled en the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and noted that no Reply Memorandum 
supporting the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. The Court afrer 
further review of the file determined that a Reply Mei'.'.oranduii; u'i 
Support of the Motion to Dismiss had been finely filed and that 
it contained argument and .Information important to the Court'L; 
consideration of the Motion to Dismiss. The Court thoruioie 
granted the Motion to Reconsider, reviewed the pleadings and the 
memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion to 
Dismiss and the Court entered its Ruling on October 2, 2001. 
Based thereon the Court finds and orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiff filed this action on July 1<1, 1998 naming as 
Defendants, Sharlene Benson, R.S, West Real Estate and Sunrise 
Title Company. 
2. Defendants Sharlene Benson and R.S. West Real Estate 
were served shortly after the complaint was filed. Both 
Defendants filed answers, discovery was undertaken and Motions 
for Summary Judgement were filed. Defendant Sunrise Title 
Corapany was not served with the Summons or Complaint. 
3. The Court dismissed part of the claims against 
Defendants, Sharlene Benson and R.S. West Real Estate and then 
the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the other claims. 
4. On June 22, 2000 all claims against Sharlene Benson and 
R,S. West Real Estate were dismissed. Defendant Sunrise Title 
Company had not been served v/ith the Summons and Complaint. 
5. On May 17, 2001, five clays short of 11 months later, 
the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, without leave of court, 
which stated different causes of action than in the original 
complaint. That amended complaint with the summons were served 
on Defendant, Sunrise Title Company on May 18, 2001. 
6> Defendant Sunrise Title Company responded by filing a 
Motion to Dismiss based on Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the time of service. 
The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the 
summons and complaint be served within 120 days oi upon a co-
defendant prior to trial. Rule 4(b) only allows service later 
than the 120 days upon a co-defendant when there are issues 
involving the co-defendants which are pending before the court. 
In this case all co-defendants had been dismissed on June 22, 
2000. Defendant, Sunrise Title Company was not served with the 
amended complaint until May IE, 2001. 
Since Defendant, Sunrise Title Company was not served within 
120 days alter filing of Lha complaint and was not served until 
11 months after all other co-defendants were dismissed the Court 
hereby ORDERS THAT: 
Defendant, Sunrise Title Company is dismissed with out 
prejudice. 
Dated this PJ|_ day October 2001 
~~ _ M%--
A. Lynn Payne 
District Judge 
